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For many years now, Peter Singer has been arguing that we should not eat meat, and that we 
should give more money to famine relief. Many have been convinced, but many more 
remain sceptical. However, on one point most of us would agree: the actions that Singer 
recommends here are certainly morally permissible. One rarely feels a twang of moral doubt 
when eating tofu curry or writing cheques to Oxfam. Even if we do not find Singer totally 
convincing, we may still feel this moral doubt when eating sirloin, or spending frivolously 
rather than charitably. If we accept the main principle in Ted Lockhart’s book Moral 
Uncertainty and Its Consequences, these twangs of moral doubt should be sufficient to make us 
amend our behaviour. 
 The main principle Lockhart endorses is that we should perform actions that we are 
maximally confident are morally permissible. We might be quite confident that having the 
sirloin is morally permissible, but if we are not certain, and we are certain the tofu is 
permissible, we should stick to tofu. Similarly, if we are certain that large donations to famine 
relief are permissible, and not certain that not making these donations is permissible, the 
chequebook should come out. The principle is not just for left-wingers. As Lockhart notes, 
approvingly, it can also be used in anti-abortion arguments. In most cases, not having an 
abortion is almost certainly permissible. Perhaps there is an exception for cases of extreme 
fetal deformity, but not in everyday cases. So if the woman considering an abortion wants to 
do the action that is most probably morally permissible, and has any doubts about the 
permissibility of the procedure, she should decline the abortion. 
 The bulk of Lockhart’s book is devoted to case studies where this principle is 
deployed, and amendments to the principle generated by considerations of these cases are 
adopted. The cases include abortion, patient confidentiality, Roe v Wade and, briefly, 
charitable giving. The theme behind the studies is that even if people cannot come to 
agreement on what is morally right, they can come to agreement on what should be done 
according to the principle, at least as variously amended, and this should be sufficient to 
provide recommendations for action. Lockhart stresses that if this line of reasoning is 
correct, then applied ethicists can provide good advice on practical action without 
conclusively resolving apparently intractable ethical problems. 
  
 There are three main amendments Lockhart suggests to the principle. First, he 
suggests that if moral rightness comes in degrees, we should maximise the expected moral 
rightness of our actions, rather than the probability that we are doing the right thing. 
Secondly, in situations where we cannot work out which action maximises expected 
rightness, because perhaps we do not have perfect access to the relevant subjective 
probabilities, we should choose the action which most probably maximises expected 
rightness, or more generally has the highest expected expected degree of moral rightness. 
And thirdly, he says that we should maximise the expected rightness of courses of action, 
rather than of individual actions. One might quibble with these amendments, particularly I 
think with the second, but they do not seem to affect the core philosophical issues. 
 The principle has some rather striking consequences, so striking we might fear for its 
refutation by a quick modus tollens. Lockhart, of course, does not think this is so. He does 
not discuss the vegetarianism issue, and endorses the anti-abortion implications, but argues 
that the principle need not have such striking implications concerning charitable giving. He 
notes that for some people, those who think it probable enough that substantial charitable 
giving is a very bad thing to do, because we have such strong obligations to ourselves and 
those nearest and dearest, his principle does not recommend such giving (109). 
 There is a more direct reason for thinking the principle stands in need of some 
further clarification and defence. It is rather unclear what kind of norm the principle is 
stating, and hence what force the should in it is has. Lockhart says it is a norm of rational 
action, but it seems in practice to be neither that, nor a moral norm. To see this, consider the 
following case where someone clearly does not follow the principle. While on her way to 
visit a sick friend in hospital, Jane is convinced by a fellow subway rider that morality 
requires an impersonal concern for the whole world. She is convinced that morality requires 
that she not visit her friend, but instead find the patient most in need of a visitor, and see 
them. But when she gets to the hospital, her new moral belief is not strong enough to 
overcome her desire to visit her friend in need, which, feeling a little guilty, she does. 
 Assuming that Jane’s newfound moral beliefs are wrong, and that in fact she did the 
right thing, what criticisms can we make of her action? Not that it was immoral, because she 
did the right thing, visiting her sick friend, and she acted for the right reason, acting out of 
care for her friend. Nor, it seems, that it was prudentially irrational, for she did what she 
believed would best satisfy her desires. Perhaps the fact that her new moral beliefs were not 
  
sufficiently motivating indicates a lack of resolve, or even a weakness of will, but alternatively 
one might think that Jane displayed commendable, and virtuous, common sense in not 
abandoning her friend precipitously. In any case, I doubt Jane’s action cannot be criticised, 
even if her resolve can be. Since Jane clearly violated Lockhart’s principle, she did not act in 
the way she thought most likely to be morally permissible, but her action seems immune from 
criticism, that suggests the principle should not be an action guiding norm. 
 One might argue that Jane has a moral responsibility to desire to do the right thing, 
and if she had this desire, she would have been rationally required to not visit her friend. If 
one believes in such a responsibility, then one will think that Jane acted against a desire she 
should have, that she was, at best, lucky that she did the right thing, and hence she was 
irrational. Lockhart compares such agents, who do the right thing against their better 
judgement, to gamblers who bet their life savings on unlikely, but ultimately successful, 
outcomes. (34) 
 This line of reasoning, however, ultimately does not provide grounds for criticising 
Jane. A moral agent may well have a moral responsibility to desire to do the things that 
happen to be the right things to do. For example, she may well have a responsibility to want 
to visit her sick friends, and to help those in need, and not cause harm to others. But she 
does not have a responsibility to want to do the right thing, whatever it turns out to be. 
Indeed, she would be a worse moral agent if many of her actions were motivated by such a 
desire. She should want to visit her friend because she cares about her friend, not because it 
is, in the abstract, the right thing to do. Michael Smith has described the desire to do the 
right thing, whatever it turns out to be, as a moral fetish, and this often seems appropriate. 
(The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 76)  
 It is no discredit to Jane that she lacks this general desire, and in some cases it may 
be a virtue. If Jane has the general desire, if in Smith’s terminology she is a moral fetishist, 
then she may be prudentially required to follow Lockhart’s principle, but not otherwise, and 
she is not required, by any normative standard, to be a moral fetishist. If Jane (virtuously) 
does not have that general desire to do the right thing, whatever it turns out to be, then she 
is importantly dissimilar to the gambler, who does (and should) desire to bet on the 
successful outcome, whatever it turns out to be.  
 Whatever the merits of Lockhart’s main principle, his approach raises several 
fascinating theoretical questions. For example, there is a substantial literature on what the 
  
motivational effects of coming to hold a new moral view are, and what they should be. But 
what is, and what should be, the motivational effects of coming to hold, say, that it is more 
probable than not that meat eating is permissible? From a different angle, if moral attitudes 
are more like desires than like beliefs, as some expressivists suggest, then can we even have 
the attitude that it is more probable than not that meat eating is permissible? Although in 
general Lockhart says little directly on these theoretical questions, it is a great service to show 
how they arise. 
 If Lockhart’s main principle is correct, it has rather radical implications for how 
applied ethics is practiced. Even if it is not, consideration of the issues Lockhart raises may 
provide a novel and valuable outlook on some familiar theoretical questions.  
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